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Abstract: For a quarter of a century, corporate governance in many countries has been viewed 
as a process of institutionalising codes of good conduct. Episodic shocks, induced by 
spectacular corporate failures, have created opportunities for more radical change, but such 
codes have proved resilient. But has this been process firmed up a thickening core? With each 
revision, the corporate governance community has come to live in a field increasing dominated 
by the ideas traditional actors – corporate management and mainstream institutional investors 
– who colonized the ill-defined territory of corporate governance at the outset. Over time, 
however, the changing investment landscape has undercut some of the principles on which 
this domination was based. Let us explore the philosophical underpinnings basis of the code, 
drawing on concepts from the writings of de Certeau (1984) and Turner (1977), to reflect on 
places, spaces, rituals, and explorations, to understand what creates and constitutes control and 
resilience, and what it says about the possibilities for innovation and experimentation. 
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Introduction 
Britain is currently in the process of reconstituting an important, iconic part of its 
framework of corporate conduct, a promised root-and-branch rethink of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code. It promises to be a major event, and potentially not just in Britain, with 
ramifications for many organisations in many countries Key aspects of the code have been 
copied throughout the world (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). The code has informed 
practice in both civil- and common-law jurisdictions, in emerging markets and developed 
economies. It has provided core concepts of good corporate governance to multilateral 
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organisations, listed and unlisted companies, public- and private-sector organisations, and 
even organs of national governance (Nordberg, 2014). 
From its inception as the Cadbury Code (1992), through a major, post-Enron revision 
(FRC, 2003), and the challenge to its integrity after the existential crisis of the global financial 
crisis (FRC, 2010), the code has proved resilient. Nordberg and McNulty (2013) show how, 
in response to these crises in the corporate world, the code has bent to embrace shifting 
understandings of what constitutes good governance but remained true to its core.  
Other revisions, at intervals of roughly two years, have made minor modifications. This 
practice of periodic revision has institutionalised a process of deinstitutionalisation, creating a 
ritual of consultation and revision and at once facilitating change while reinforcing its 
legitimacy. Resilience implies both flexibility and rigidity, a balance between a solid centre 
and a surface to absorb shocks. That raises uncomfortable questions for a code now a quarter 
of a century old. When does a core ossify or the surface become brittle? How does change 
proceed when the crisis isn’t one in the core constituencies of corporate management and 
investment practice? How does change proceed when the motivation for it come from a crisis 
in national governance, the shock of Brexit and the questions of legitimacy of government 
itself through an ill-timed election and the ill-run campaign? 
In this work-in-progress paper, I seek to explore ways of understanding the problem in 
preparation for an analysis of how the code revision itself proceeds. I do so by bringing into 
discussion two perspectives little used in corporate governance literature but with much to say 
about resilience in the face of change. First is work drawing on ideas of the French sociologist, 
Michel de Certeau (1984), who distinguishes between the concepts of place and space. Place 
in de Certeau embodies definition and ownership; space facilitates emergence, lacks 
definition, and connotes freedom of action. Second is a stream of thinking that developed from 
the writings of the British anthropologist Victor Turner (1977) concerning rituals and rites of 
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passage and the creation of liminal spaces where hierarchy is suspended, temporarily, to 
encourage creativity.  
This paper proceeds by discussing briefly the institutional and market context of corporate 
governance, with reference to the UK and the 2018 revision of the code currently unfolding. 
It then examines place and space through de Certeau’s writings and its elaboration into the 
world of management and entrepreneurship through Hjorth (2004, 2005), and company 
secretaries (McNulty & Stewart, 2015). Next is the concept of liminality, as developed by van 
Gennep (1909/2013) and Turner (1977), and then modified to illuminate the work of 
management consultants (Czarniawska & Mazza, 2003), expatriate managers of multinational 
businesses (Guimarães-Costa & Pina e Cunha, 2009), and boards of directors (Concannon & 
Nordberg, 2018). Using the issues under discussion in the current revision process of the UK 
code, the paper then examines the overlap between place, space, and liminality, asking 
questions about the ontologies these standpoints inhabit, and what that says about 
(de)institutionalisation and resilience. It concludes with observations on codification and ideas  
Corporate governance in context 
From its inception as the Cadbury Code (1992), through a major, post-Enron revision 
(FRC, 2003), and the challenge to its integrity after the existential crisis of the global financial 
crisis (FRC, 2010), the code has proved resilient. Nordberg and McNulty (2013) show how, 
in response to these crises in the corporate world, the code has bent to embrace shifting 
understandings of what constitutes good governance but remained true to its core. Other 
revisions, recently at intervals of roughly two years, have made relatively minor modifications.  
In many ways the UK code had created a template for the mitigation of the principal-agent 
problem identified in agency theory (Fama, 1980), in which managers’ interests are misaligned 
with those of shareholders. First Cadbury (1992) and then the Higgs Review (2003) placed 
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emphasis on board structures and director independence as central to increasing accountability 
to shareholders. Alternatively, stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997) 
holds that, rather than being self-interested schemers or lazy skivers, managers generally seek 
to do a good job. Its remedies to the ills of corporate governance and directly opposed those 
of agency theory.  
This practice of periodic revision has institutionalised a process of deinstitutionalisation, 
creating a ritual of consultation and revision and at once facilitating change while reinforcing 
its legitimacy. Resilience implies both flexibility and rigidity, a balance between a solid centre 
and a surface to absorb shocks. But scholars have long argued that institutionalisation hardens 
the process, and that the rules it embodies become decoupled from the changing world around 
them (Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  
That raises uncomfortable questions for a code now a quarter of a century old. When does 
a core ossify or the surface become brittle? How does change proceed when the crisis isn’t 
one in the core constituencies of corporate management and investment practice? How does 
change proceed when the motivation for it come from a crisis in national governance, the 
shock of Brexit and the questions of legitimacy of government itself through an ill-timed 
election and the ill-run campaign? These questions we raise here require a type of analysis that 
goes beyond the theoretical thinking familiar to scholars of corporate governance, using 
different and less familiar theoretical perspectives.  
Perspectives of resilience and change 
Two perspectives offering philosophical insights on resilience and change can provide 
new ways of thinking about the old conundrums of corporate governance: first, who will guard 
the guardians, and second, how firms explore if their boards always seek to control. These 
perspectives, drawn from sociology and anthropology, appear in more practical literatures as 
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diffuse as architecture and town planning, to management consultancy and remote and 
temporary working.  They are, however, little used in corporate governance literature but have 
much to say about resilience and innovation in the face of change. First is work drawing on 
ideas of the French sociologist, Michel de Certeau (1984), who distinguishes between the 
concepts of place and space. Second is a stream of thinking that developed from the writings 
of the British anthropologist Victor Turner (1977) concerning rituals and rites of passage and 
the creation of liminal spaces where hierarchy is suspended, temporarily, to encourage 
creativity.  
Place vs. space 
These concepts, derived from the work of Lefebvre (1974/1991) and Bachelard 
(1957/1994), take on a subtle meaning in the work of de Certeau (1984; de Certeau, Giard, & 
Mayol, 1998). He divides the world into categories of being. Place refers to an abstraction of 
physical or psychological dimensions, the parts of a field with definition, boundaries and rules, 
a signification ownership or control;1 place is a “configuration of positions” implying an 
“indication of stability” (de Certeau, 1984, p. 117). Space, by contrast, is the location of 
movement, the “intersections of mobile elements … term dependent upon many different 
conventions” (de Certeau, 1984, p. 117). Spaces may be seen therefore as open territories 
between places, where rules are in the process of becoming, a continuing unfolding that 
resonates with Heidegger (1927/2010) and Gadamer (1975/2013). These concepts find 
elaboration into the world of management and entrepreneurship through Hjorth (2004, 2005), 
and within the corporate governance literature in a partial way in a recent study of company 
secretaries (McNulty & Stewart, 2015).  
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Ritual, and liminal spaces 
The concept of space also resonates with the liminality discussed in anthropology and 
associated with rituals and rites of passage. As developed by van Gennep (1909/2013) and 
Turner (1977), liminality implies a condition on the threshold between one state and another. 
The elders of a tribe temporarily dispense with hierarchy, play with the young males, instil 
them with the culture of adulthood, before inducting them into the society of men. The state 
of being between states, with its ambiguities and uncertainties allows for playfulness and 
learning, while the rules become embedded through experience rather than coercion. In 
management studies, the concept has been employed to illuminate the work of management 
consultants (Czarniawska & Mazza, 2003), expatriate managers of multinational businesses 
(Guimarães-Costa & Pina e Cunha, 2009), creative people working from remote locations 
(Vesala & Tuomivaara, 2018), and boards of directors (Concannon & Nordberg, 2018). 
Issues of place, space, and liminality in the UK code debate 
Early attempts to solve the agency problem suggested market mechanisms, like share 
options and other incentives, to limit agency risk (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The Cadbury Code 
and others that it inspired took a different approach, where rules created structure, encouraged 
director independence, and later emphasised the interpersonal relationships on the board 
(Nordberg & McNulty, 2013), which highlights the institutional side of governance. 
Many writers have analysed the codification of corporate governance in institutional terms 
(Aguilera & Yip, 2004; Capron & Guillén, 2009; Estrin & Prevezer, 2011; Haxhi & Aguilera, 
2017; Judge, Douglas, & Kutan, 2008). Codes set the formal and semi-formal rules of how 
boards work and how they interact with investors. Institutional theory has puzzled over how 
to account for change, either radical (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996) or even gradual (Mahoney 
& Thelen, 2010). Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings (2002) theorised that an exogenous, 
precipitating jolt might dislodge the taken-for-gra
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process of de-institutionalisation. DiMaggio (1988) proposed the concept of institutional 
entrepreneurship, in which social actors at the periphery of the field tapped into sources of 
legitimacy in adjacent fields. Other writers extended the concept to include efforts to disrupt, 
alter, or maintain an institution during times of doubt, called the phenomenon institutional 
work (Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). Those routines and rituals and their often tacit explanations 
of legitimacy spawned interest in the concept of institutional logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991; 
Thornton & Ocasio, 1999).  
Many scholars have considered the effects of adoption of such institutional arrangements, 
and especially the UK code (e.g. Doble, 1997; Koutoupis, 2012; MacNeil & Li, 2006), but 
comparatively little attention has been paid to the processes involved it creating and revising 
them. Spira and Slinn (2013) take a historical perspective on the development of the Cadbury 
Code, using the Cadbury archive at the University of Cambridge to trace the interplay of social, 
political, and economic actors, the issues they highlighted, and how they resolved into the 
language of the first code. Two recent studies (Nordberg, 2017a, 2017b) take a thematic 
approach to the code’s origins and its development through crises of confidence in the early 
2000s and then through the 2007-09 financial crisis. Those three works indicate how the 
company directors, and especially their chairmen and associations, jostled with representatives 
of asset management firms, insurance companies and pension funds for power over the 
language of the code. They point us towards an interpretation of corporate governance as a 
field with twin focal points, mediated by professional actors, most notably the large 
accountancy firms and their professional organisations. Other actors are heard in the debates, 
but their voice are then marginalised as the codes pass from ideas, to drafts, to the final 
language that then shapes and controls behaviour.  
Those studies provide a narrative of events and the beginnings of a conceptualisation of 
the process. But they stop well short of theorising how these forces interact. They provide 
 8  
tantalising if preliminary insights into why marginalised voices participate and continue to 
engage in a process where their power is limited. They point, therefore, to a value in examining 
those processes themselves as a social phenomenon. And because a) the UK code and its 
processes have informed corporate governance debate in many countries, and b) the process 
of codification has echoes in many field (e.g. the fabled Lamfalussy process in the European 
Union), undertaking such a study will have policy as well as theoretical and practical benefits. 
This study intends to address that challenge by comparing the process of the 2018 major 
revision with what took place in other periods, analysing those differences through the lenses 
of liminality and de Certeau’s place-space distinction. From this preliminary view, the 
Cadbury code ventured into unclaimed territory, with echoes of unorganised space. Previous 
code revisions have similarities to the rites of passage recounted in Turner.  
But if the periphery abuts un- or less-theorized spaces, in de Certeau’s sense, where 
institutionalisation is weak, the rules less well defined, and actors are open to the possibilities 
of change and becoming, then change seems more likely. In his specialised vocabulary, de 
Certeau (1984) say places are marked by the strategies they exhibit, that is, that the power 
relationship that allow the actor to generate relations with an “exterior distinct from it”, (de 
Certeau, 1984, p. xix), such as competitors, customers, etc. In spaces, however, actors rely on 
tactics; a tactic “insinuates itself into the other’s place, fragmentarily, without taking it over 
in its entirety” (de Certeau, 1984, p. xix). This suggests a more activist approach to change, 
rather than the opportunism associated with early depictions of institutional entrepreneurship. 
Places, spaces, strategies, and tactics describe the constellations of power, as opposed to the 
determinism that often seems to dominate institutional theory. In the work of Hjorth (2004, 
2005), these ideas are translated into the world of disruptive entrepreneurs and innovators. 
Liminality offers another view of the process of codification. The anthropological 
accounts of (Turner, 1977) sees structure yielding (temporarily) to anti-structure for the sake 
 9  
of easing the uninitiated into the society. The freedom in liminal spaces provides avenues for 
creativity, but with the object of bringing those into support of the established order. 
Management scholars, including Czarniawska and Mazza (2003) and Sturdy, Schwarz, and 
Spicer (2006) see this at work in management consultancy, a business that resides in a 
permanent state of liminality, never inside, but never quite outside.  
Further development 
With this starting point, the paper will use the history of the corporate governance code in 
the UK as an example of the contestation for power over the definition of good corporate 
governance as it emerged in the 1990s and then developed through its first 25 years. It will 
examine how mainstream investors – domestic pension funds, collective investment 
organizations, and insurance companies – created a discourse that legitimated shareholder 
primacy as a dominant logic in the emerging field. It then vied with managerial discretion, the 
previous dominant view, for authority over the emerging standards of corporate governance. 
These actions can be seen as transforming the ill-defined corporate governance space into 
controlled places. Consultation processes opened the field to experimentation and innovation, 
but codification constrained the remaining space and new actors emerged to colonize other 
parts of the field.  
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 Place in French is “lieu”, and in de Certeau “lieu propre”, a phrase his translators have struggled to portray. 
The word “propre” denotes something clean but also connotes something owned; its usage thus suggests places 
are ordered and possessed, where rules exist and are generally followed. 
                                               
